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1. Introduction 
 
Governments exist to provide public goods, address externalities, deal with imperfect 
information and overcome absence of specific markets (Grossman, 1988). Over time, the 
justification for government’s existence became more complex since, for example, public 
investment in capital (both physical and human) was found to increase private productivity (and, 
hence, propel growth forward) (Khan and Kumar, 1997)2 and social and general welfare support 
was seen as a desirable outcome (in face of, e.g., widespread needs stemming from acceleration in 
urbanization or upward social mobility).3  
The last Global Financial Crisis highlighted many countries’ fragilities and forced many 
governments to consider austere fiscal adjustment strategies and serious restructuring plans of their 
own public sectors. However, such rationing requirements deal directly with hard and highly (both 
politically and socially) sensible issues related to the appropriate (or “optimal”) size of the 
government (expenditure). Rationally, the answer to this should depend on the contribution of each 
(expenditure) component to economic growth (Devarajan et al., 1996). However, in practice such 
answer is more complicated. 
The relationship between government size and economic development goes back to Wagner´s 
“Law of Increasing State Activity”. This Law states that as industrialization proceeds and 
development progresses, the relative importance of government spending in GDP will grow 
(Gemmel, 1993). According to Peacock and Scott (2000), this law refers to an absolute and relative 
increase in the size of the government within a given economy. Relatedly, the “voracity hypothesis” 
states that in response to a given shock to real GDP, government spending will rise by even more 
in percentage terms. Wagner explains the positive correlation between economic expansion and 
government growth in the long-run with an ongoing “cultural and economic progress” which 
substitutes private economic activity for state activity (Wagner, 1883).4 Note that Wagner himself 
was nonetheless aware of the revenue constraints to continued public sector expansion (Peacock 
and Wiseman, 1961). 
Existing empirical studies on the existence of the Wagner´s Law remain inconclusive. In fact, 
according to Durevall and Henrekson (2011), 65 percent of the studies reviewed find direct or 
 
2 The relationship between public spending and economic growth has been an important subject of discussion among 
economists for decades (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Gupta, 1967). Note however that the role of the government in 
facilitating economic prosperity is still controversial particularly regarding certain activities in which many argue that 
public ownership results in inefficient resource allocation (Khan and Kumar; 1997). Moreover, many government 
operations can crowd out private investment and distort economic incentives, leading to sub-optimal decisions and, 
therefore, harming growth (King and Rebelo, 1990). That being said, this paper’s scope is not centered around debates 
surrounding the pros and cons of privatization (for that, the reader should refer to Vickers and Yarrow (1988)). 
3 Until the 20th century public revenues were considered more important than public expenditure, while functions and 
activities of the state were confined to specific limits (World Bank, 1988). This was inverted in subsequent decades. 
Governments can affect economic activity through several policy instruments and today one of the important 
instrument of fiscal policy is public spending (Lahirushan and Gunasekara, 2015). 
4 Henrekson (1993) develops the reasons behind Wagner’s belief that the government’s role would increase over time 
as a result of economic growth. 
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indirect evidence in favor of the Wagner’s Law, while 35 percent provide no support. Against this 
background, in this paper we assess the responses of different components of government spending 
to changes in economic activity both in the short and long-run and also evaluate the main 
determinants of the obtained cyclicality coefficients. In other words, we empirically revisit the 
validation of the Wagner’s Law and the “voracity hypothesis” in a sample of 149 developing 
countries between 1980-2015. A perusal of the literature (see next section) reveals no such study 
for such a large sample of developing countries carried out in a consistent way.  
While in the literature on the size of the public sector with respect to a country’s level of 
economic development has received much attention, we make several novel contributions. First, 
since some economists criticized Wagner’s Law because of ambiguity of the measurement of 
government expenditure (Musgrave, 1969), instead of looking at aggregate public expenditures, 
we go much more granular into the different components of government expenditure. In fact, 
Shelton (2007) argued that the empirical validation of the Wagner’s Law depends upon the 
preferences of fiscal policies set by governments and, hence, disaggregated the various categories 
of public spending. Second, we check the validity of the Law via panel data approaches that allow 
for the existence of cointegrating relationships between government expenditure and output. Third, 
since aggregate panel results hide cross-country heterogeneity, we inspect individual countries´ 
short and long-run cyclicality coefficients one at the time. Fourth, since voracity has been 
attributed to weak institutions (Stein et al., 1999; Akitoby et al., 2006), we inspect which key 
(political economy) determinants matter more in affecting short and long-run coefficients. Finally, 
we cross-check our baseline results with several robustness exercises, such as taking into account 
potential endogeneity concerns in estimating these spending elasticities and directly testing the 
existence of cointegration in the panel. 
Evidence presented in this paper does not overwhelmingly support the existence of higher than 
unity long-run elasticities of government spending components vis-a-vis economic growth, 
suggesting that the Wagner’s regularity is more the exception than the norm. However, this result 
depends on the exact component of government spending. In fact, great majority of EMEs display 
acyclical government spending policies confirming Frankel et al.´s (2013) claim that developing 
countries are escaping from the procyclicality curse. In LICs the number of procyclical cases is 
still slightly higher vis-à-vis EMEs. Moreover, the case for voracity is fading away as developing 
countries catch-up the development ladder and graduate from procyclicality with sounder fiscal 
policies that are better able to provide the well needed stabilization to shocks. In the short-run, 
most elasticity estimates suggest countercyclicality. Finally, some macroeconomic and 
institutional and political characteristics affect the degree of government spending cyclicality. 
However, the degree of political economy interference is less pervasive that other authors have 
uncovered for advanced economies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 presents the analytical framework, empirical methodology and underlying data. 
Section 4 discusses the main results. The last section concludes. 
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2. Review of the Empirical Literature 
 
The literature has tested empirically the relationship between government spending and 
national income using several panel data approaches in both advanced and developing countries 
samples (but with the majority leaning more heavily on the former group). Empirical studies on 
this issue show that Wagner’s Law differs from country to country and from period to period.  
Time series studies focusing specifically on developing countries include the work by Ansari 
et al. (1997) who analyzed the relationship between national income and government expenditure 
for African countries from 1957 to 1990. Depending on the country they found evidence either in 
favor of Wagner’s or Keynesian’s hypothesis. Babatunde (2011) analyzed the existence of 
Wagner’s hypothesis in Nigeria from 1970 to 2007 and found weak evidence supporting the 
Keynesian hypothesis. Ziramba (2008) analyzed the relationship between public spending and 
output in South Africa from 1960 to 2006 and found evidence of bi-directional causality. Thabane 
and Lebina (2016) confirmed the validity of the Wagner’s hypothesis in Lesotho from 1980 to 
2012. In another part of the developing world, Faris (2002) investigated the relationship between 
public spending and output for GCC countries from 1970 to 1997. Causality tests showed that the 
Wagner’s hypothesis was applicable in these countries except Bahrain. Iyare and Lorde (2004) on 
the other hand, focused on several Caribbean countries from 1950 to 2000 and in most of the 
countries the Wagner’s hypothesis was found to be valid. Montiel (2010) found evidence 
supporting the Wagner’s hypothesis in Mexico from 1950 to 1990. In Asia, Afzal and Abbas (2010) 
examined the existence of Wagner’s hypothesis in Pakistan from 1960 to 2007. They found 
evidence in favor of the Wagner’s Law for total public spending, defense spending, interest 
payments and fiscal deficit. Rauf et al. (2012) and Muhammad et al. (2015) in contrast, found no 
causal link exists between public spending and output in the short run in Pakistan. Samudram et 
al. (2009) examined the existence of Keynesian or Wagner’s hypothesis in Malaysia from 1970 to 
2004. They found evidence of bidirectional causality. Abdullah and Mamoor (2010) also looked 
at the Malaysian case and found that long run relationship existed between government 
expenditure and economic growth. 
Panel data studies looking at large heterogeneous samples, include the early paper by Ram 
(1987) who found no support for the Wagner’s Law for a sample of 115 countries over 30 years. 
Chang et al. (2004) who examined the applicability of Wagner’s hypothesis in both advanced and 
emerging countries from 1951 to 1996. Causality tests revealed that the Wagner’s hypothesis was 
valid in Japan, US, UK, South Korea and Taiwan. Akitoby et al. (2006) determined the existence 
of a long-term relationship between economic activity and public expenditure using data of 51 
countries over 32 years. Kolluri and Wahab (2007) found evidence supporting the Wagner’s law 
for OECD countries but not for EU countries. For a sample of 23 OECD countries between 1970 
and 2006, Lamartina and Zaghini (2011) concluded for the validity of Wagner’s perspective. 
Afonso and Jalles (2014) study the causal relationship between spending and growth for 155 
countries over 30 years. Their results supported the existence of the Wagner’s law. Mahmoodi and 
Mahmoodi (2014) examined the relationship between government expenditure and economic 
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growth in twenty Asian countries from 1970 to 2010. Lahirushan and Gunasekara (2015) also 
examined the impact of government spending on economic growth on a sample of Asian countries 
and found evidence favoring both Keynesian and Wagner’s hypothesis in short run.  
 
3. Econometric Strategy and Data 
 
3.1 Analytical Framework 
 
To empirically assess the validity of the Wagner’s law, we need to specify an econometric 
specification linking output and government expenditure. At this level of generality, the Law 
allows multiple versions (Mann, 1980).5 To Henrekson (1993) it is unclear whether the law of 
increasing size of the state’s activity relates to the absolute level of government or to the share of 
government in national income. Dutt and Ghosh (1997) argued that Wagner was neither explicit 
in hypothesis formulation nor presented his law in mathematical form. Absence of agreement on 
the functional form describing the Wagner’s Law, led to different econometric specifications being 
applied to different countries (Halicioglu, 2003).6 
With the exception of Akitoby et al. (2006), the majority of cross-country studies estimating 
the cyclicality of government expenditure have relied on panel approaches which do not fully 
exploit the time-series properties of the underlying data – recall the Wagner´s Law is a long-run 
concept. Moreover, most of these panel approaches are not well suited to properly and fully 
decompose short from long-run effects. One of the contributions of this work is the use of both the 
time-series and cross-sectional aspects of developing country data using an error-correction 
framework to assess fiscal cyclicality and, hence, confirm or refute the Wagner´s hypothesis.  
We empirically investigate the relationship between government expenditure and output by 
generalizing Lane´s (2003) approach to encompass both short and long-term effects between the 
two variables. Specifically, as in Akitoby et al. (2006), government expenditure cyclicality is 
defined in relation to its movement vis-à-vis output.7 We differentiate co-movements that are 
temporary and those that reflect a steady-state or long-term equilibrium level. Assume there exists 
a steady-state relation between government expenditure and output expressed as follows: 
 
 𝐺 = 𝐴𝑌ఏ (1) 
 
where G represents real government expenditure, Y represents real GDP and 𝜃 is the long-run, 
constant elasticity of spending with respect to GDP. A positive value of 𝜃 is consistent with an 
expansive interpretation of Wagner´s Law, as it implies that government spending rises with output. 
 
5 In fact, the imprecision of the Law has led to the development of multiple versions of Wagner’s hypothesis 
(Gandhi, 1971). 
6 See Demirbas (1999) for five alternative versions of the Wagner’s Law. 
7 If potential output were observable or easy to estimate, one could define countercyclicality (procyclicality) as an 
above-average (below-average) spending to output ratio whenever output was below (above) its potential. However, 
measuring potential output is difficult, particularly in a development country setting. 
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If 𝜃 is greater than one then this would be consistent with a narrow interpretation of Wagner´s Law, 
where government expenditure rises faster than output.  
 
3.2 Empirical Approach 
 
Equation (1) can be written in linear form by log-linearizing it, as follows: 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑙𝑛𝑌, 𝛼 = 𝑙𝑛𝐴 (2) 
 
If the adjustment of spending G to its steady-state ?̅? is gradual, then the level of spending will 
respond to transitory changes in output, and G will move gradually toward its steady-state. To 
capture these gradual move, we base our analysis on an unrestricted error correction 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) (p,q) representation: 
𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝐺௜௧ = 𝜑௜𝑙𝑛𝐺௜௧ିଵ + 𝜃௜𝑙𝑛𝑌௜௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝜆௜௝𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝐺௜௧ି௝ +
௣ିଵ
௝ୀଵ
෍ 𝛾௜௝𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑌௜௧ି௝
௤ିଵ
௤ୀଵ
+ 𝜇௜ + 𝜉௜௧ ,    
  𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇 (3) 
 𝜇௜ denote fixed effects to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and time-invariant 
characteristics (such as geography, etc.); 𝜑௜ is a scalar coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 
𝜃  is a scalar coefficient on our key explanatory variable, real GDP; 𝜆௜௝ correspond to coefficients 
on lagged first-differences of the dependent variable, and 𝛾௜௝ correspond to coefficients on first-
differences of our key explanatory variable and its lagged values. We assume that the disturbances 
𝜉௜௧ in the ARDL model are independently distributed across i and t, with zero means and constant 
variances. Equation (3) implies that developments in expenditures can be explained by a 
distributed lag of order p of the dependent variable and a distributed lag of order q of GDP.  
Assuming that 𝜑௜ < 0 for all i, there exists a long-run relationship between 𝐺௜௧and 𝑌௜௧ defined as: 
 𝑙𝑛 𝐺௜௧ = 𝜎௜ 𝑙𝑛 𝑌௜௧ + 𝜂௜௧ , 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇 (4) 
where 𝜎௜ = −𝜃௜/𝜑௜ is the long-run coefficient and 𝜂௜௧  are stationary with possible non-zero 
means.8 Equation (3) can then be rewritten as: 
𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝐺௜௧ = 𝜑௜𝜂௜௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝜆௜௝𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝐺௜௧ି௝ +
௣ିଵ
௝ୀଵ
෍ 𝛾௜௝𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝑌௜௧ି௝
௤ିଵ
௤ୀଵ
+ 𝜇௜ + 𝜉௜௧ , 
 
8 Note that the existence of cointegration does not imply causality, which is consistent with Wagner´s view that there 
is not necessarily a cause and effect relationship between economic development and government activity (Peacock 
and Scott, 2000). 
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𝑖 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑇 (5) 
where 𝜂௜௧ିଵ is the error correction term and 𝜑௜ is measures the speed of adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium. In cases where 𝜑௜  is insignificant, there is no steady-state relationship 
between government expenditure and output and 𝛾௜  is best estimated by omitting the error 
correction term. 
Equation (5) is estimated for both aggregate government expenditure and its main 
components, namely wages and salaries, goods and services, capital expenditure, non-interest 
expenditure and interest payments. We fully exploit the panel dimension which has several 
advantages over traditional time series approaches.9  Parameters in equation (5) are estimated using 
the Mean Group (MG) estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). The MG is appropriate for the analysis 
of dynamic panels with both large time and cross-section dimensions, and it has the advantage of 
accommodating both the long-run equilibrium and the possibly heterogeneous dynamic adjustment 
process.10  
In what follows, we perform three main exercises.  
First, we implement three different panel unit root tests: two first generation tests, namely the 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test (IPS); the Maddala and Wu (1999) test (MW) and one second 
generation test – the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test. The latter test is associated with the fact that first 
generation tests do not account for cross-sectional dependence of the contemporaneous error terms, 
and not considering it may cause substantial size distortions in panel unit root tests (Pesaran 
2007).11  
Secondly, we estimate equation (5) for the sample of emerging market economies and the 
sample of low-income countries are retrieve the short and long-run coefficient estimates as well as 
the speed of adjustment coefficients. We do so for the respective panels as well as for each country. 
We inspect the temporal stability of these key coefficient estimates by splitting the time span 
before and after the Global Financial Crisis (that we take as a major structural break). 
Finally, we use the short and long-run cyclicality coefficient estimates as dependent variables 
in a cross-section regression that aims to check which political economy determinants matter the 
most. A number of explanations have been put forward to justify different cyclical fiscal patterns 
in different groups of countries. The two main reasons behind the observation of fiscal 
procyclicality in developing countries are: i) inadequate access to international credit markets and 
lack of financial depth (Gavin et al., 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
 
9 First, it enables bypassing lack of degree-of-freedom related to (potentially) short spanned time series at the cross-
section level. Second, hypothesis testing is more powerful and inference stronger than when using time series 
techniques on only one country. Third, cross-sectional information reduces the probability of a spurious regression 
(Barnerjee, 1999). 
10This estimator allows correcting for the potential bias that could result from estimating cyclicality coefficients using 
standard fixed-effects models in the presence of nonstationary error terms, which imposing parameter homogeneity 
would introduce into the estimating equation. 
11 We rely on panel stationarity tests - in contrast with Akitoky et al. (2006) – because the relatively short time span 
for some expenditure components and/or countries, renders low power to single-country unit root tests. Conducting 
Pesaran´s (2004) cross-sectional dependency tests for real GDP and each government expenditure variable, we reject 
in all cases the null of cross-sectional independence in our panel with p-values close to zero. 
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2008) and ii) political distortions and weak institutions (Tornell and Lane, 199912; Alesina et al., 
2008; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Fatas and Mihov 2013; Abbott, Cabral, Jones, 
Palacios, 2015). As Stein et al. (1999) pointed out – looking at a sample of Latin American 
countries - a large number of effective parties and weak support for the governing party were 
associated with stronger procyclicality. Similarly, Lane (2003) also acknowledges that political-
economy factors explain the cyclicality of government spending in OECD countries. With this in 
mind, we run the following regression: 
 
 𝜎ො௜ = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑋𝑖 + 𝜔𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (6a) 
 𝛾ො௜ = 𝑏 + 𝜏𝑋𝑖 + 𝜔𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (6b) 
 
where 𝜎ො௜ , 𝛾ො௜ denote the long and short-run cyclicality coefficients, respectively; 𝑋 is a vector of 
basic controls found in the literature to affect spending cyclicality and 𝑃𝑂𝐿 is a vector of political-
economy variables. 𝜀௜ is an i.i.d disturbance term satisfying standard assumptions.  
Since the dependent variable in equation (6) is based on estimates, the regression residuals can 
be thought of as having two components. The first component is sampling error (the difference 
between the true value of the dependent variable and its estimated value). The second component 
is the random shock that would have been obtained even if the dependent variable was observed 
directly as opposed to estimated. This would lead to an increase in the standard deviation of the 
estimates, which would lower the t-statistics. This means that any correction to the presence of this 
un-measurable error term will increase the significance of our estimates. To address this issue, 
equation is estimated using Weighted Least Squares (WLS). Specifically, the WLS estimator 
assumes that the errors in equation (6) are distributed as 𝜀௜~𝑁(0,
ణమ
௦೔
), where 𝑠௜   are the estimated 
standard deviations of the spending cyclicality coefficients for each country i, and 𝜗ଶ  is an 
unknown parameter that is estimated. 
 As far as determinants in 𝑋 , we include real GDP per capita as a proxy of economic 
development in line with Talvi and Vegh (2005). This variable is expected to be negatively 
correlated with procyclicality. Government size has typically been found to be the most important 
driver (Woo, 2009; Furceri, 2010; Fatas and Mihov, 2013; Afonso and Jalles, 2014). We include 
the government expenditures-to-GDP ratio which is expected to negatively affect the degree of 
procyclicality under the assumption of unitary elasticity of taxes to GDP. Several variables have 
been used as proxies of the stringency of financial constraints. One is the degree of trade openness 
(defined as the sum of exports and imports over GDP) as a measure of access to foreign capital 
markets: economies that are more open to trade tend to be more exposed to external shocks and 
may use more actively fiscal policies in order to provide increased stabilization (Lane, 2003; Woo, 
2009). Another the private credit-to-GDP ratio, as a higher level of financial development 
 
12 Tornell and Lane (1999) seminal framework highlighted different political blocs competing for a share of fiscal 
revenues. They argued that competition among these fiscal blocs increased during the boom period. This approach 
resulted in increased government expenditure as compared to increased general income – an effect known as voracity. 
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positively influences the ability of the government to borrow during downturns, and therefore it is 
expected to decrease fiscal procyclicality.  Political-economy variables – vector 𝑃𝑂𝐿 - comprise 
of: dummies for the occurrence of executive elections since during elections politicians may be 
tempted to change fiscal components for electoral reasons and not necessarily for macroeconomic 
stabilization purposes (Persson and Tabellini, 2000); a proxy for constrains on the executive - 
following Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Fatas and Mihov (2013) - that captures potential veto points 
on the decisions of the executive and this variable is likely to reduce spending volatility and 
negatively influence procyclicality; the margin of majority, proportional representation, checks 
and balances, the polity2 indicator and regime durability. All these variables are retrieved from the 
Database of Political Institutions. 
 
3.3 Data and Stylized Facts 
 
Our empirical analysis uses a sample of 149 countries, split between 91 emerging market 
economies (EME) and 58 low-income countries (LIC) from 1980-2015. The complete list of 
countries by country-group is provided in the Appendix. The overall size of the sample is dictated 
by data availability from the Government Financial Statistics. More specifically, we rely on annual 
data for the following government expenditure components: wages and salaries, goods and 
services, capital, non-interest and interest payments. Note that the panel is unbalanced as each 
country’ time series coverage differs. Data for real GDP and the GDP deflator come from the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook. Table A1 in the Appendix presents summary statistics.  
Figure 1 below shows the time evolution of each government expenditure category by 
plotting the mean, median and top and bottom quartiles of the distribution for sample of developing 
countries. Total government expenditure declined from the early 1980s (from around 40 percent 
of GDP) until the early 2000s (to around 30 percent of GDP) to start increasing afterwards. The 
share of expenditure on wages and salaries has remained relatively flat over time in contrast with 
expenditure on goods and services which declined considerably and also public investment (to a 
lesser extent). This is worrisome as (productivity) growth is typically – in a standard Neoclassical 
Growth Model - propelled by (private and public) investment and this category has not been able 
to gain relative dimension over other spending components.13 The rationalization effort of public 
expenditure is patent in the dynamics of non-interest expenditure. The Great Moderation phase 
also contributed to lower the burden from interest payments as interest on government debt 
lowered since the 1980s bringing down that bill significantly. 
 
[insert Figure 1] 
  
 
13 Recall, however, Pritchett’s (1996) “white elephant” hypothesis according to which not all public investment in 
developing countries is productive. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Panel Stationarity  
As a first step, Tables 1 and 2 report the panel unit root tests for output and government 
expenditure (and its components) for our sample of developing countries. We observe that in 
general one cannot reject the null of all country series in the case of real GDP containing a non-
stationary process. In contrast, for total government expenditure and its components, we generally 
reject the null of panel unit root at a high significance level. 
 
[insert Tables 1 and 2] 
 
4.2 Short and Long-Run Estimates 
 
Table 3 reports the panel estimates of estimating equation (5) for EMEs and LICs 
separately. We get a negative and always (expect in specification 12) statistically significant 
adjustment coefficient - 𝜑௜ -, indicating dynamic stability. From these significant coefficients we 
can conclude there is a cointegrating relationship between government expenditure and output. 
Looking at the long-run coefficient, it is generally statistically not different from zero except for 
LIC´s and total government expenditure and capital expenditure (at the 10 percent level). This 
means that there seems to exist a long-term relationship between government expenditure 
(particularly capital) and output in the panel of LICs, a fact consistent with the Wagner´s Law. For 
total government expenditure the significant coefficient for LICs is larger than one consistent with 
the narrow interpretation of the Law, that is, that the public sector in this group of countries 
increase in relative importance over time. The short-run coefficient is typically negative and highly 
significant everywhere.  
 
[insert Table 3] 
 
One can discriminate the country-specific coefficients. The resulting coefficients for the 
speed of adjustment, the short and long-run cyclicality can be summarized using histograms in 
Figures 2-4, respectively, and for each expenditure category. The speed of adjustment is the largest 
(in absolute value) for the case of capital expenditure. While interest payments have an average 
speed of adjustment close to zero (suggesting that the correction towards the long-run steady state 
is very slow-moving), it is also the category where the standard deviation of such coefficients is 
the largest. 
 
[insert Figures 2-4] 
 
In Figure 3 we plot the histograms for the long-run coefficients. The average long-run 
coefficient is the largest for expenditure on goods and services (and also the one with the highest 
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cross-cross variation as shown by the standard deviation). In all cases the mode of long-run 
coefficients – in line with the evidence provided in Table 3 – is close to zero. 
Finally, Figure 4 summarizes the information regarding the short-run coefficients. 
 
Aggregate statistics and summarizing tools such as the histogram, while useful to give an 
overall picture, hide considerable heterogeneity across countries. As in Akitoby et al. (2006), we 
plot in Tables 4, 5 and 6 the country specific coefficients from estimating equation (5).  In cases 
where the speed of adjustment - 𝜑௜  - is significant, we can conclude there is a cointegrating 
relationship between a given government expenditure variable and output. Tables 5a and 5b report 
the associated long-term elasticity, while Tables 6a and 6b show the short-run cyclicality 
coefficients. 
The most salient results are as follows. 
For most EMEs, there is a long-term relationship between government expenditure and 
GDP (Table 4a), consistent with Wagner´s Law. The error correction term is significant in about 
50 percent of the countries in the sample for total government expenditure and more than 70 
percent for each spending aggregate with most of the sample having a significant error correction 
term for at least one of the spending aggregates. For example, the error correction term is 
significant for interest payments in Hungary but is insignificant for the other spending aggregates. 
As expected, the adjustment coefficients are (in general) negative (some exceptions such as 
Venezuela for total government expenditure suggesting an “explosive” system), indicating 
dynamic stability. Recall again that the implication of a significant error correction term is that 
there is in fact a long-term relationship between government spending and GDP. In Table 4b we 
have the country-specific 𝜑௜  for LICs. Here the share of statistically significant coefficients is 
smaller relative to the EMEs sample. Hence, in LICs we find less cases supporting the existence 
of a long-run coefficient between expenditures and output. 
 
[insert Tables 4a and 4b] 
 
In Table 5a we show the long-run coefficients for EMEs. In only 22 percent of the cases 
we find a statistically significant coefficient, with most of them being positive. This suggests 
procyclicality for the countries with positive and significant coefficients, but for the great majority 
evidence seems to point to acyclicality. 14  This contrasts with previous literature looking at 
developing countries that typically found evidence of procyclical patterns, that is, spending 
indicators comoving positively with the business cycle (Gavin et al., 1996; Kaminsky, Reinhart 
and Vegh, 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008; Diallo, 2009). In fact, our results 
 
14 Most discussions on the cyclicality patterns of fiscal policy in general are centered around two main theories linking 
it to business cycle fluctuations: the Keynesian approach and the Neoclassical tax-smoothing model (Barro, 1979). 
The Keynesians posit that governments should spend and tax countercyclically, i.e., boosting demand through 
increased spending or lower taxes during a recession and doing the opposite during booms (Prasad and Gerecke, 2010). 
In contrast, Barro’s tax-smoothing model recommends acyclical fiscal policy that helps keep government expenditure 
and tax rates constant regardless of output fluctuations. 
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confirm Frankel et al.´s (2013) claim that developing countries are escaping from the procyclicality 
trap. These authors argued that over the last decade about one third of the developing world 
escaped the procyclicality trap and engaged in countercyclical fiscal policy. In a small number of 
countries (e.g. Croatia) fiscal policy is, in fact, countercyclical in the long-run (this is true for total 
government expenditure and any sub-component under scrutiny). Moreover, in the cases where 
the long-run coefficient is positive and significant, it is often larger than one which is consistent 
with the narrow interpretation of Wagner´s law and indicating that in the long term, the public 
sector is increasing in relative importance (e.g. South Africa, Venezuela, Suriname, Angola). In 
LICs – Table 5b – about one third of the countries display a procyclical long-run coefficient, a 
larger percentage vis-à-vis EMEs. For instance, in Guinea, Uganda or Uzbekistan, the coefficient 
is larger than one while in Niger, Liberia or Afghanistan it is positive but smaller than one – 
consistent with the expansive interpretation of Wagner´s Law. 
 
[insert Tables 5a and 5b] 
 
Finally, the short-run elasticity of government spending to GDP is negative in most of the 
countries in the sample in contrast with the evidence presented by Akitoby et al. (2006) who looked 
at a smaller country coverage and time span (see Tables 6a and 6b). For all spending categories, 
the mean coefficient values are negative. For instance, in EMEs for Armenia and in LICs for 
Mozambique, the short-run elasticities are positive and statistically significant with a coefficient 
value above unity. This fact is consistent with the voracity hypothesis, as it suggests that in 
response to a given shock to real GDP, government spending will rise by even more in percentage 
terms. This situation is even stronger when interest payments are excluded.  
 
[insert Tables 6a and 6b] 
 
Overall, our findings contrast less sharply (than previous literature) with those obtained for 
developed countries which often suggest either a countercyclical behavior of fiscal policy or no 
clear patterns (acyclicality) (see e.g. Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002). The size of the long-run 
elasticity with respect to output varies greatly across countries (much more than the short-run 
elasticity). When comparing the short-term and the long-term coefficients for countries where 
there is a long-term relationship between government spending and output, we find that in most 
cases the long-run elasticity is larger than that for the short-run (in absolute value). 
 
4.3 Robustness 
We check the robustness of the previous set of findings in three main ways. 
First, we investigate the possibility of endogeneity in estimating the cyclicality coefficients. 
For OECD countries, Lane (2003) finds that endogeneity was not an issue and he used OLS to 
estimate cyclicality coefficients. In Table A2 in the Appendix we present the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
statistics for country-specific endogeneity tests. A single-country two stage least squares 
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regression was estimated for total government expenditure using the first lag of domestic GDP and 
the growth rate of main trading partners as instruments for real GDP. Results reveal that 
endogeneity could have deleterious effects on our estimates in 30 out of 149 countries for total 
government spending which represents only 20 percent of the sample. Excluding countries for 
which null hypothesis of no-endogeneity could not be rejected and re-estimating equation (5) 
yields coefficient estimates qualitatively similar to those present in Table 3. This suggests that 
endogeneity concerns are not an issue.  
 
Second, as identified in the introduction, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had a major 
impact on the way public finances are conducted. We re-estimated equation (5) splitting the time 
span before and after 2008 (the first year of the GFC). Results in Table A3 show the coefficient 
estimates for EMEs and LICs using total government expenditure as dependent variable. We 
observe that while before the GFC the long-run coefficient is positive and larger than one, 
suggesting a procyclical fiscal policy in EMEs, afterwards results point to long-run acyclicality. 
Hence, this major structural break did change the path of government size expansion in these 
countries. In addition, the speed of adjustment is considerably larger after the GFC than before. 
This is also true for other expenditure components (Table A4). There is no statistically significant 
difference with respect to the short-run coefficients between the two time periods.  
 
Third, we inspect whether government expenditure (and its components) and GDP are 
cointegrated within the panel. To this end, we implement the panel cointegration tests proposed by 
Pedroni (2004). This is a residual-based test for the null of no cointegration in heterogeneous 
panels.15  We use four within-group tests and three between-group tests to check whether the panel 
data are cointegrated. In Table A5 the columns labelled within-dimension contain the computed 
value of the statistics based on estimators that pool the autoregressive coefficient across different 
countries for the unit root tests on the estimated residuals. The columns labelled between-
dimension report the computed value of the statistics based on estimators that average individually 
calculated coefficients for each country. Results of the within-group tests and the between-group 
tests show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected only in the cases of output 
with wages and salaries and output with capital expenditure (particularly in the case of LICs). 
Therefore, the relationships identified in equations (3) and (4) are cointegrated for the panel of all 
countries in our sample for these two categories of spending. In the remaining cases, there is no 
evidence of a significant stable long-run relationship. 
  
 
15 Two classes of statistics are considered. The first type is based on pooling the residuals of the regression along the 
within-dimension of the panel; the second is based on pooling the residuals of the regression along the between-
dimension of the panel. 
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4.4 Political Economy Determinants of Spending Cyclicality 
 
Our final exercise is the inspection of the relevance of certain political economy variables 
in affecting short and long-run cyclicality coefficients in our sample of developing countries. 
Estimating equation (6a) (6b) for each of the long-run (short-run) coefficient estimates previously 
obtained we get the results present in Table 7a (Table 7b).  
 
[insert Tables 7a and 7b] 
 
We find that, the initial level of per capita GDP is generally negative but not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the level of development in itself is not a factor explaining fiscal 
procyclicality in our sample of developing countries. We also find that economies more open to 
trade tend to be less procyclical even though the significance is inexistence. Similarly, countries 
with larger government are also able to provide more stabilization by acting more countercyclically. 
Finally, most political economy variables do not seem to matter much in explaining the degree of 
procyclicality in the short-run. In the long-run however, having elections often increases the degree 
of procyclical fiscal policy, while proportional representation lowers it. Finally, we get a negative 
and weakly significant (i.e., at the 10 percent significance level) relation between democracy and 
procyclicality, suggesting that increased democracy improves fiscal management which is in 
contrast with the findings of Alesina and Tabellini (2005). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper empirically revisited the validity of Wagner’s proposition by focusing on different 
components of government expenditure and looking at both the short and the long-run. The panel 
under scrutiny consisted of 149 developing countries between 1980-2015. We relied on panel data 
approaches and contributed to the literature by estimating underlying cointegrating relationships 
and uncovering short and long-run cyclicality coefficients for different countries. In addition, we 
assessed which political economy determinants (if any) affected these elasticities.  
For most EMEs, there seems to exist a long-term relationship between government expenditure 
and GDP, a fact consistent with Wagner´s Law. The number of significant error correction terms 
is much smaller in the case of LICs. However, this result depends on the exact component of 
government spending. Moreover, in EMEs evidence points to procyclicality in a relatively small 
number countries with positive and significant long-run elasticities, but with the great majority 
displaying acyclical government spending policies. This contrasts with previous literature looking 
at developing countries that typically found evidence of procyclical patterns but confirms Frankel 
et al.´s (2013) claim that developing countries are escaping from the procyclicality curse. In LICs 
about one third of the countries display a procyclical long-run coefficient, a larger percentage vis-
à-vis EMEs. This is likely to have amplified GDP fluctuations and, more generally, weakened the 
development efforts in several of these LICs. In some cases, the significant long-run cyclicality 
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coefficients are larger than one, a fact consistent with the narrow interpretation of Wagner´s Law. 
Furthermore, in a small number of countries, short-run elasticities are positive and statistically 
significant with a coefficient value above unity consistent with the voracity hypothesis. However, 
this is considerably less prevalent in our paper than in previous studies looking at earlier time 
periods. Interestingly, in most cases we found evidence of counter-cyclicality in the short-run in 
several government spending components. As far as robustness is concerned, endogeneity does 
not seem to be an issue and the GFC acted as a major structural break since it changed the patterns 
of government size expansion in this sample of these developing countries. Finally, we uncovered 
that some macroeconomic and institutional and political characteristics can affect the degree of 
government spending cyclicality. However, the degree of political economy interference is less 
pervasive that other authors have uncovered for advanced economies. 
All in all, evidence presented in this paper does not overwhelmingly support the existence of 
higher than unity elasticities of government spending categories vis-a-vis economic growth, 
suggesting that the Wagner’s regularity is more the exception than the norm. Also, the case for 
voracity is fading away as developing countries catch-up the development ladder and graduate 
from procyclicality with sounder fiscal policies that are better able to provide the well needed 
stabilization to shocks. 
Future research on the topic should consider looking at the consequences for this group of 
countries of the graduation from procyclical to countercyclical government fiscal policy in terms 
of domestic macroeconomic volatility and long-term growth.   
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Figure 1: Evolution of Government Expenditures (% GDP) in Developing Countries over 
time, 1970-2015 
 
Total Government Expenditure Expenditure on Wages and Salaries 
  
Expenditure on Goods and Services Capital Expenditure 
  
  
Non-interest Expenditure Interest Payments 
  
Note: blue line denotes the average or mean across all countries; red line denotes the median across all countries; 
yellow line denotes the 25th percentile of the distribution across all countries; green line denotes the 75th percentile of 
the distribution across all countries. 
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Figure 2. Histograms for the adjustment speed, Developing Countries 
Total government expenditure Expenditure on Wages and Salaries 
  
mean: -0.12; sd dev.: 0.14 mean: -0.32; sd dev.: 0.67 
Expenditure on Goods and Services Capital Expenditure 
  
mean: -0.25; sd dev.: 0.49 mean: -0.39; sd dev.: 0.84 
Non-interest Expenditure Interest Payments 
  
mean: -0.33; sd dev.: 1.50 mean: -0.02; sd dev.: 2.19 
Note: histogram of country-specific adjustment speed coefficients resulting from estimating equation (5). All 
coefficients considered. 
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Figure 3. Histograms for the long-run coefficients, Developing Countries 
Total government expenditure Expenditure on Wages and Salaries 
  
mean: 4.23; sd dev.: 33.26 mean: -0.25; sd dev.: 4.62 
Expenditure on Goods and Services Capital Expenditure 
  
mean: 8.17; sd dev.: 110.42 mean: -0.02; sd dev.: 2.27 
Non-interest Expenditure Interest Payments 
  
mean: 3.84; sd dev.: 48.98 mean: 0.98; sd dev.: 28.35 
 
Note: histogram of country-specific long-run coefficients resulting from estimating equation (5). All coefficients 
considered. 
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Figure 4. Histograms for the short-run coefficients, Developing Countries 
Total government expenditure Expenditure on Wages and Salaries 
  
mean: -1.33; sd dev.: 2.68 mean: -0.97; sd dev.: 2.08 
Expenditure on Goods and Services Capital Expenditure 
  
mean: -1.32; sd dev.: 3.21 mean: -0.97; sd dev.: 2.09 
Non-interest Expenditure Interest Payments 
  
mean: -1.37; sd dev.: 3.18 mean: -1.41; sd dev.: 3.15 
Note: histogram of country-specific short-run coefficients resulting from estimating equation (5). All coefficients 
considered. 
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Table 1: First Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) Panel Unit Root Test (IPS) (a) 
 Real GDP Government expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital expenditure Non-interest expenditure Interest Payments 
in levels lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] lags [t-bar] 
               
EME 0.60 2.56 0.59 -7.06*** 0.18 -18.42*** 0.38 -11.26*** 0.43 -14.68*** 0.55 -10.52** 0.38 -12.71*** 
               
               
               
LIC 0.59 11.93 0.43 -1.15 0.22 -12.70*** 0.34 -10.82*** 0.17 -11.10*** 0.41 -7.53*** 0.55 -13.15*** 
               
               
 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) Panel Unit Root Test (MW) (b)   
  Real GDP Government expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital expenditure Non-interest expenditure Interest Payments 
 lags p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) 
 in levels               
EME 0 171.868 0.403 957.919 0.000 1269.868 0.000 1151.328 0.000 1176.807 0.000 1184.705 0.000 836.776 0.000 
 1 141.482 0.932 459.764 0.000 449.019 0.000 483.229 0.000 636.375 0.000 456.079 0.000 613.591 0.000 
 2 115.949 0.999 439.740 0.000 473.349 0.000 438.934 0.000 223.680 0.003 455.308 0.000 403.278 0.000 
 in levels               
LIC 0 41.280 1.000 782.123 0.000 800.286 0.000 638.309 0.000 648.909 0.000 719.581 0.000 751.303 0.000 
 1 40.174 1.000 375.177 0.000 326.076 0.000 379.183 0.000 327.102 0.000 404.896 0.000 215.235 0.000 
 2 29.254 1.000 440.538 0.000 552.020 0.000 458.958 0.000 362.396 0.000 478.079 0.000 273.420 0.000 
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. (a) We report the average of the country-specific “ideal” lag-augmentation (via AIC). We report the t-bar statistic, constructed 
as  ii tNbart )/1( ( it are country ADF t-statistics). Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic has a non-standard 
distribution: the critical values (-1.73 for 5%, -1.69 for 10% significance level – distribution is approximately t) are reported in Table 2, Panel A of their paper. We 
indicate the cases where the null is rejected with ***. (b) We report the MW statistic constructed as  )log(2 ii pp ( ip are country ADF statistic p-values) for 
different lag-augmentations. Under the null of all country series containing a nonstationary process this statistic is distributed )2(2 N . We further report the p-
values for each of the MW tests.
Table 2: Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests 
 Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS)   
  Real GDP Government expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital expenditure Non-interest expenditure Interest Payments 
                
 lags p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) p  (p) 
 in levels               
EME 0 3.543 1.000 -5.526 0.000 -7.134 0.000 -10.150 0.000 -8.852 0.000 -10.806 0.000 -6.076 0.000 
 1 2.776 0.997 -5.190 0.000 -8.002 0.000 -9.838 0.000 -7.050 0.000 -8.412 0.000 -5.605 0.000 
 2 7.641 1.000 -6.445 0.000 -9.736 0.000 -6.715 0.000 -10.186 0.000 -9.843 0.000 -12.734 0.000 
 in levels               
LIC 0 7.630 1.000 -4.960 0.000 -4.972 0.000 -4.800 0.000 -4.818 0.000 -5.108 0.000 -4.525 0.000 
 1 2.296 0.898 -6.821 0.000 -5.916 0.000 -8.621 0.000 -5.864 0.000 -7.352 0.000 -6.016 0.000 
 2 5.391 1.000 -5.047 0.000 -2.533 0.000 -6.425 0.000 -2.575 0.000 -2.153 0.016 -4.158 0.000 
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. The null hypothesis is of nonstationarity. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Mean Group Regressions, EME vs LIC 
Dependent variable Government Expenditure Wages and Salaries Goods and Services Capital expenditure Non-interest expenditure Interest Payments 
Country Group EME LIC EME LIC EME LIC EME LIC EME LIC EME LIC 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Speed of adjustment -0.128*** -0.114*** -0.288*** -0.393*** -0.220*** -0.314*** -0.335*** -0.480*** -0.234*** -0.488 -0.201*** 0.261 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.139) (0.020) (0.100) (0.021) (0.175) (0.021) (0.316) (0.015) (0.462) 
Short run coefficient -1.360*** -1.286*** -0.993*** -0.947** -1.194*** -1.533** -1.036*** -0.885** -1.275*** -1.520** -1.333*** -1.552*** 
 (0.228) (0.442) (0.152) (0.370) (0.200) (0.602) (0.150) (0.374) (0.200) (0.594) (0.195) (0.592) 
Long run coefficient 2.221 7.406* -0.570 0.231 12.126 1.972 -0.256 0.339* 1.386 7.700 -1.687 5.178 
 (3.665) (3.996) (0.599) (0.249) (14.689) (3.211) (0.272) (0.210) (4.152) (8.018) (2.082) (4.976) 
            
Observations 3,781 2,350 2,187 1,381 2,902 1,814 2,187 1,381 2,902 1,814 2,902 1,814 
Note: Estimation of Equation (5). Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
 Table 4.a Error correction model: adjustment term, Emerging Market Economies 
 
 
Country  Total expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital  Non-interest  Interest payments 
Turkey -0.006 -0.076*** -0.023 -0.082*** -0.018 -0.029 
South Africa -0.099** -0.157 -0.173*** -0.214 -0.148** -0.186*** 
Argentina 0.006 0.068 -0.044* 0.122 -0.042 -0.050* 
Brazil -0.005 -0.230*** -0.009 -0.236*** -0.008 -0.012 
Chile -0.075*** -0.271*** -0.032 -0.491*** -0.028 -0.086* 
Colombia -0.027 -0.151*** -0.063** -0.194*** -0.058** -0.091*** 
Costa Rica -0.017 -0.104* -0.275*** -0.270** -0.274*** -0.258*** 
Dominican Republic -0.049 -0.227 -0.087 -0.187 -0.076 -0.109* 
Ecuador -0.136** -0.401** -0.165* -0.189 -0.200* -0.233*** 
El Salvador -0.180*** -0.387** -0.305** -0.309* -0.386*** -0.272*** 
Guatemala -0.033 -0.255*** -0.096 -0.561*** -0.088 -0.078 
Mexico -0.052*** -0.039 -0.072*** -0.021 -0.063*** -0.084*** 
Panama -0.123*** -0.382** -0.154 -0.195 -0.137 -0.251*** 
Paraguay -0.063* -0.106* -0.045 -0.137* -0.039 -0.076 
Peru 0.009 -0.440*** -0.018 -0.489*** -0.016 -0.023 
Uruguay -0.004 -0.164*** -0.034* -0.186*** -0.031 -0.052** 
Venezuela 0.141*** -0.040 0.002 -0.044 -0.003 -0.021 
Antigua and Barbuda -0.090** -0.314** -0.197** -0.310* -0.538*** -0.206*** 
Bahamas, The -0.104** -0.444** -0.241** -0.598*** -0.586*** -0.262*** 
Barbados -0.117** -0.347** -0.155 -0.350** -0.299** -0.316*** 
Dominica -0.093** -0.355** -0.200** -0.238* -0.405*** -0.208*** 
Grenada -0.092** -0.354** -0.218** -0.423** -0.606*** -0.256*** 
Guyana 0.014 -0.579*** 0.000 -0.658*** 0.002 -0.033 
Belize -0.122*** -0.253** -0.225** -0.335** -0.565*** -0.209*** 
Jamaica -0.055 -0.276*** -0.237** -0.292*** -0.239*** -0.215** 
St. Kitts and Nevis -0.088** -0.338** -0.244*** -0.368** -0.552*** -0.184*** 
St. Lucia -0.096** -0.351** -0.186** -0.242 -0.384*** -0.141*** 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines -0.105** -0.341** -0.222** -0.420** -0.662*** -0.209*** 
Suriname 0.048* -0.014 0.047 -0.040 0.054 0.038 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.048* -0.068 -0.073 -0.244* -0.050 -0.170*** 
Bahrain -0.143** -0.400*** -0.193* -0.321** -0.248* -0.327*** 
Iran -0.047 -0.488*** -0.197* -0.535*** -0.198* -0.182* 
Iraq -0.708*** -0.993*** -0.893*** -0.835*** -0.946*** -0.556** 
Jordan -0.054 -0.443*** -0.152** -0.184 -0.120* -0.238*** 
Kuwait -0.127** -0.307** -0.353*** -0.238 -0.312** -0.232*** 
Lebanon -0.025 -0.646*** -0.099*** -0.504*** -0.097*** -0.107*** 
Oman -0.112* -0.400** -0.138* -0.226* -0.308** -0.154** 
Qatar -0.149** -0.315** -0.116 -0.226* -0.140 -0.227** 
Saudi Arabia -0.133** -0.369** -0.185** -0.167 -0.271** -0.192** 
Syria -0.067 -0.231** -0.034 -0.380* -0.039 -0.044 
United Arab Emirates -0.206*** -0.263* -0.244** -0.265** -0.274** -0.385*** 
Egypt -0.163** -0.584*** -0.092 -0.574*** -0.064 -0.081 
Brunei Darussalam -0.233*** -0.107 -0.296** -0.910*** -0.239** -0.317*** 
Sri Lanka -0.066 -0.199* -0.195*** -0.971*** -0.191** -0.229*** 
India -0.029 -0.259*** -0.122*** -0.318*** -0.101* -0.149*** 
Indonesia -0.229*** -0.260*** -0.218*** -0.325*** -0.243*** -0.265*** 
Timor-Leste -0.621** -0.846*** -0.796*** -0.506* -0.419** -0.392*** 
Malaysia -0.214*** -0.327*** -0.308*** -0.431*** -0.341*** -0.241*** 
Maldives -0.094 -0.329** -0.215** -0.254* -0.294** -0.183** 
Pakistan -0.332*** -0.200** -0.381*** -0.398*** -0.256*** -0.234*** 
Philippines -0.098*** -0.080 -0.126*** -0.251* -0.101** -0.164*** 
Thailand -0.063 -0.167*** -0.155* -0.352*** -0.185*** -0.174*** 
Algeria -0.010 -0.307*** -0.012 -0.317*** 0.005 -0.045 
Angola 0.084*** -0.064* 0.071*** -0.064* 0.071** 0.068** 
Botswana -0.204** -0.231** -0.416*** -0.334** -0.269** -0.304*** 
Cabo Verde -0.045 -0.135 -0.356*** -0.216 -0.339*** -0.307*** 
Equatorial Guinea -0.081 -0.235 -0.486*** -0.285* -0.352*** -0.371*** 
Gabon -0.168** -0.250** -0.410*** -0.269* -0.279** -0.256*** 
Libya -0.008 -0.063 -0.018 -0.060 -0.008 -0.104 
Mauritius -0.065 -0.241* -0.443*** -0.644*** -0.382*** -0.262*** 
Morocco -0.063 -0.246* -0.351*** -0.269 -0.375*** -0.289*** 
Seychelles -0.059 -0.196* -0.042 -0.138 -0.048 -0.122 
Namibia -0.270** -0.192* -0.272* -0.267* -0.226* -0.176 
Swaziland -0.144 -0.176* -0.242** -0.294** -0.207** -0.203*** 
Tunisia -0.086 -0.167 -0.331*** -0.239 -0.393*** -0.289*** 
Fiji -0.093 -0.278* -0.235** -0.441** -0.252** -0.200*** 
Vanuatu -0.098* -0.276** -0.365*** -0.383** -0.418*** -0.284*** 
Samoa -0.030 -0.160 -0.225*** -0.547*** -0.234*** -0.270*** 
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Tonga -0.175 -0.153 -0.303** -0.810*** -0.236* -0.175** 
Marshall Islands -0.261 -0.520** -0.429* -0.394** -0.349** -0.221* 
Micronesia -0.172 -0.615*** -0.609*** -0.492*** -0.439*** -0.149** 
Armenia -0.556*** -0.529*** -0.571*** -0.540*** -0.538*** -0.546*** 
Azerbaijan -0.319*** -0.340*** -0.378*** -0.359*** -0.356*** -0.364*** 
Belarus -0.174*** -0.163*** -0.179*** -0.173*** -0.171*** -0.180*** 
Albania 0.054 -0.422*** 0.028 -0.500*** 0.043 -0.011 
Georgia -0.139 -0.317** -0.223 -0.495** -0.274* -0.338* 
Kazakhstan -0.334*** -0.347*** -0.405*** -0.367*** -0.374*** -0.383*** 
Bulgaria -0.019 -0.397*** -0.028 -0.410*** -0.025 -0.039 
Russia -0.200*** -0.187*** -0.198*** -0.194*** -0.199*** -0.201*** 
China -0.016 -0.231** -0.101** -0.299** -0.069* -0.115*** 
Turkmenistan -0.150** -0.149** -0.150** -0.150** -0.154** -0.165** 
Ukraine -0.258*** -0.292*** -0.303*** -0.300*** -0.302*** -0.334*** 
Serbia -0.189** -0.193** -0.214* -0.201* -0.200* -0.226* 
Montenegro, Rep. of -0.130 -0.171 -0.245 -0.271 -0.147 -0.101 
Hungary 0.023 -0.035 -0.022 -0.070 0.021 -0.086* 
Croatia -0.735*** -0.667*** -0.786*** -0.694*** -0.714*** -0.710*** 
Macedonia, FYR -0.592*** -0.539*** -0.665*** -0.571*** -0.597*** -0.617*** 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.235 -0.570** -0.635*** -0.448* -0.528** -0.386 
Poland 0.006 -0.194*** -0.032 -0.239** -0.024 -0.041 
Kosovo -0.185 -0.162 -0.193 -0.252 -0.131 -0.105 
Romania 0.028* -0.136*** 0.021 -0.139*** 0.024 0.011 
# significant 49 73 63 71 64 70 
Share significant 54% 80% 69% 78% 70% 77% 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4.b Error correction model: adjustment term, Low-Income Countries 
 
Country  Total expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital  Non-interest  Interest payments 
Bolivia -0.010 -0.124** -0.080 -0.373*** -0.080 -0.088* 
Haiti -0.007 -0.153*** -0.010 -0.183*** 0.000 -0.051 
Honduras -0.053 -0.144*** -0.036 -0.207*** -0.020 -0.037 
Nicaragua 0.009 -0.680*** 0.009 -0.745*** 0.010 0.005 
Yemen -0.067 -0.135 -0.135 -0.169 -0.141 -0.137 
Afghanistan -0.307 -0.785** -0.605 -0.537 -0.548 -0.627 
Bangladesh -0.066** -0.244* -0.292*** -0.593*** -0.377*** -0.279*** 
Bhutan -0.079 -0.221*** -0.211*** -0.332*** -0.166*** -0.195*** 
Myanmar -0.366** -0.396** -0.397** -0.562** -0.388** -0.413** 
Cambodia -0.102 -0.184** -0.145 -0.273** -0.106 -0.127 
Lao P.D.R. -0.019 -0.086 -0.076* -0.112* -0.069 -0.092** 
Nepal -0.058 -0.271*** -0.109* -0.387*** -0.089 -0.115** 
Vietnam -0.010 -0.651*** -0.033 -0.435*** -0.030 -0.043 
Djibouti -0.282 -0.315* -0.273** -0.326** -0.357*** -0.155* 
Burundi 0.004 -0.020 0.006 -0.024 0.012 -0.043 
Cameroon -0.133 -0.529*** -0.279*** -0.748*** -0.214** -0.244*** 
Central African Republic -0.156* -0.194* -0.323** -0.229* -0.189* -0.234*** 
Chad -0.090 -0.206* -0.366*** -0.277** -0.222** -0.307*** 
Comoros -0.171** -0.152 -0.447*** -0.238* -0.289*** -0.342*** 
Congo, Republic of -0.175** -0.169* -0.387*** -0.228* -0.254** -0.302*** 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.005 -0.153*** -0.002 -0.153*** -0.003 -0.006 
Benin -0.158** -0.179 -0.357*** -0.200 -0.238** -0.245*** 
Eritrea -0.125* -0.167** -0.193* -0.212* -0.205** -0.633*** 
Ethiopia -0.037 -0.251*** -0.097 -0.275*** -0.074 -0.153* 
Gambia, The -0.220*** -0.264* -0.252*** -0.428*** -0.280*** -0.239*** 
Ghana 0.011 -0.109** -0.122*** -0.130** -0.111** -0.134*** 
Guinea-Bissau -0.237** -0.192* -0.306*** -0.231* -0.242** -0.282*** 
Guinea -0.041 -0.241* -0.120 -0.197 -0.142* -0.148** 
Côte d'Ivoire -0.280*** -0.232* -0.403*** -0.257* -0.266** -0.280*** 
Kenya -0.122*** -0.260*** -0.209*** -0.363*** -0.183*** -0.207*** 
Lesotho -0.060 -0.345*** -0.270*** -0.478*** -0.291*** -0.235*** 
Liberia -0.555*** -0.885*** -0.945*** -0.889*** -0.540** -0.434*** 
Madagascar 0.025 -0.149 -0.091** -0.251* -0.065 -0.114** 
Malawi -0.023 -0.071 -0.030 -0.084 -0.027 -0.062 
Mali -0.105 -0.223** -0.341*** -0.280** -0.200* -0.259*** 
Mauritania -0.100 -0.097 -0.162 -0.200* -0.140* -0.205** 
Mozambique 0.011 -0.175*** -0.064 -0.210*** -0.063 -0.079* 
Niger -0.154** -0.240** -0.371*** -0.290** -0.246** -0.350*** 
Nigeria -0.124 -0.087 -0.145 -0.199 -0.141 -0.179 
Zimbabwe -0.153 -0.840*** -0.888*** -0.784*** -0.456* -0.240** 
Rwanda 0.025 -0.199*** 0.017 -0.273*** 0.014 -0.063 
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São Tomé and Príncipe 0.009 -0.140** -0.014 -0.151** -0.011 -0.035 
Senegal -0.138* -0.162 -0.372*** -0.225 -0.249** -0.307*** 
Sierra Leone -0.012 -0.141*** -0.058*** -0.156*** -0.054*** -0.068*** 
Sudan 0.020 -0.062 0.011 -0.059 0.017 0.004 
South Sudan -0.378 -8.199 -5.798 -10.374 -18.490 26.574 
Tanzania 0.004 -0.133* -0.044 -0.182* -0.037 -0.060* 
Togo -0.117* -0.244** -0.391*** -0.296** -0.251** -0.316*** 
Uganda 0.034 -0.607*** -0.043 -0.648*** -0.040 -0.052** 
Burkina Faso -0.142* -0.180 -0.357*** -0.223* -0.240** -0.298*** 
Zambia 0.015 -0.189*** -0.020 -0.211*** -0.017 -0.029 
Solomon Islands 0.017 -0.073 -0.024 -0.109 -0.036 -0.148*** 
Papua New Guinea -0.091* -0.155** -0.110* -0.202** -0.105* -0.174*** 
Kyrgyz Republic -0.574*** -0.558*** -0.610*** -0.617*** -0.596*** -0.643*** 
Moldova -0.426*** -0.438*** -0.473*** -0.488*** -0.469*** -0.556*** 
Tajikistan -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.205*** -0.185*** -0.206*** -0.212*** 
Uzbekistan -0.130*** -0.119*** -0.134*** -0.141*** -0.132*** -0.144*** 
Mongolia 0.007 -0.219*** -0.002 -0.231*** 0.004 -0.013 
# significant 20 44 33 47 32 41 
Share significant 34% 76% 57% 81% 55% 71% 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.a Error correction model: Long-Run Coefficient, Emerging Market Economies 
 
Country  Total expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital  Non-interest  Interest payments 
Turkey -10.119 -1.358 -4.952 -0.623 -6.973 -4.342 
South Africa 2.668*** 1.364* 1.725*** 1.314** 1.763** 0.679 
Argentina 258.836 6.814 -27.061 4.032 -28.601 -23.247 
Brazil -152.428 -2.240 -189.550 -2.207 -223.431 -147.392 
Chile -2.098 -0.207 -3.680 -0.177 -3.888 -1.522 
Colombia -1.466 0.755 -0.439 0.779** -0.228 -0.409 
Costa Rica -3.148 -0.240 1.351*** 0.779** 1.453*** 0.778*** 
Dominican Republic 1.389 1.204*** 1.616 1.057*** 1.562 0.843 
Ecuador -0.133 0.039 -0.349** -0.058 -0.187* -1.015*** 
El Salvador -0.079 -0.051 -0.408*** -0.399 -0.256*** -1.161*** 
Guatemala -0.605 0.213 -0.445 0.072 -0.433 -1.667 
Mexico 0.596 -4.751 -3.447 -7.833 -4.204 -3.690 
Panama -0.120 0.028 -0.203* -0.066 -0.094 -0.650*** 
Paraguay 1.846** 0.505 -2.231 0.722 -2.411 -1.216 
Peru 55.139 -0.032 -31.523 -0.159 -36.142 -24.743 
Uruguay -110.070 0.179 -10.923 0.381 -11.874 -6.417 
Venezuela 7.870*** 6.360 -14.807 8.446 38.602 8.578 
Antigua and Barbuda -0.407 -0.067 -0.323*** -0.503** -0.264*** -1.061*** 
Bahamas, The -0.412 -0.030 -0.591*** -0.775*** -0.438*** -1.752*** 
Barbados -0.129 -0.076 -0.700* -0.805** -0.617*** -2.604*** 
Dominica -0.447 0.001 -0.573*** -0.343 -0.366*** -1.634*** 
Grenada -0.343 -0.054 -0.361*** -0.469*** -0.273*** -1.101*** 
Guyana 35.159 0.559*** 1,318.369 0.293*** 287.434 -15.151 
Belize -0.140 -0.167 -0.206*** -0.419*** -0.154*** -0.648*** 
Jamaica 6.460 4.795** 6.496*** 3.678* 6.766*** 4.828*** 
St. Kitts and Nevis -0.394 -0.024 -0.278*** -0.447*** -0.216*** -1.046*** 
St. Lucia -0.191 -0.037 -0.313** -0.463 -0.273*** -1.283*** 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines -0.251 -0.069 -0.406*** -0.546*** -0.282*** -1.228*** 
Suriname 15.041*** -50.0514 19.035* -13.586 18.103** 22.111 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.319 -0.883 -0.270 -0.217 -0.602 -0.618** 
Bahrain -0.069 0.005 -0.232** -0.194 -0.157*** -0.708*** 
Iran 7.701* 3.443*** 5.560*** 3.178*** 5.674*** 4.817*** 
Iraq -0.303*** -0.384*** -0.388*** -0.395*** -0.413*** -0.599*** 
Jordan -0.026 -0.003 -0.103 -0.093 -0.099 -0.521*** 
Kuwait -0.080 -0.012 -0.280*** -0.162 -0.204*** -0.778*** 
Lebanon -4.132 -0.131* 0.843 -0.447*** 0.908 0.289 
Oman -0.016 0.026 -0.234 -0.178 -0.154*** -0.945*** 
Qatar 0.003 0.007 -0.036 -0.045 -0.035 -0.350*** 
Saudi Arabia 0.104 0.028 -0.348** 0.106 -0.148* -0.997*** 
Syria 1.702 -0.005 -3.889 0.008 -2.258 -4.218 
United Arab Emirates -0.042 -0.031 -0.241*** -0.229* -0.135*** -0.717*** 
Egypt 1.505*** 0.740*** 0.851 0.461*** 0.692 -0.202 
Brunei Darussalam -0.901*** -1.761 -1.398*** -1.474*** -0.971*** -2.709*** 
Sri Lanka 0.723 0.750*** 0.764*** 0.659*** 0.840*** 0.304** 
India 0.802 0.437*** 0.641*** 0.266** 0.718*** 0.167 
Indonesia 1.321*** 1.505*** 1.216*** 1.336*** 1.329*** 0.857*** 
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Timor-Leste 0.139*** 0.077** 0.058 0.134 0.044 0.007 
Malaysia 0.142** 0.042 -0.010 -0.160* 0.054 -0.424*** 
Maldives 0.123 0.162** 0.137* 0.019 0.186*** -0.219* 
Pakistan 1.273*** 1.096*** 1.121*** 1.025*** 1.130*** 0.500** 
Philippines 1.012*** 0.830 0.703* 0.573* 0.741* -0.017 
Thailand -0.486 -0.513 -0.388 -0.361** -0.222 -0.816*** 
Algeria -0.220 0.364 -7.939 0.237 26.960 -2.400 
Angola 18.314*** -14.419 22.157*** -14.110 22.290*** 22.723*** 
Botswana 0.863*** 1.170*** 0.862*** 1.007*** 0.837*** 0.394** 
Cabo Verde -0.613 -0.278 -0.125 -0.297 -0.061 -0.518*** 
Equatorial Guinea -0.035 -0.016 0.026 -0.046 0.031 -0.092** 
Gabon 1.043* 0.5838 0.323 0.191 0.439 -0.869 
Libya 2.957 -1.106 -3.319 -0.467 -5.848 -0.454 
Mauritius 0.204 0.403 0.424*** 0.324*** 0.415*** -0.222 
Morocco 0.012 -0.131 -0.317** -0.292 -0.235** -0.944*** 
Seychelles 0.404 2.010*** 1.855 2.127* 2.112 -0.120 
Namibia 1.310*** 1.260** 1.198*** 1.066*** 1.113*** 0.588 
Swaziland 1.464*** 1.460** 0.889** 1.218*** 0.848** 0.189 
Tunisia 0.854*** 0.325 0.307*** 0.289 0.398*** -0.271 
Fiji 0.369 0.519 0.047 -0.142 0.254 -1.118** 
Vanuatu 0.088 -0.325 -0.551*** -0.668** -0.426*** -1.419*** 
Samoa -3.170 -0.661 -0.524* -0.600*** -0.367 -1.303*** 
Tonga 0.383 0.930 0.314 0.538** 0.257 -0.998 
Marshall Islands 0.320 -0.014 0.132 0.062 -0.094 -0.589 
Micronesia -0.086 -0.826** -0.562* -2.223** -1.269*** -2.760 
Armenia -0.007 -0.248 -0.194 -0.354 -0.284 -0.716 
Azerbaijan -0.079 -0.266 -0.199 -0.266 -0.260 -0.488* 
Belarus 1.880 1.497 2.063 1.837 1.732 1.590 
Albania 4.793* -0.404 9.441 -0.522* 6.915 -24.842 
Georgia 0.181 -0.084 0.103 -0.092 -0.104 -0.535** 
Kazakhstan 0.659** 0.314 0.371 0.303 0.298 -0.043 
Bulgaria -18.312 -0.063 -18.044 -0.087 -22.454 -14.267 
Russia 0.307 -0.115 0.193 0.042 0.022 -0.498 
China -0.841 -0.245 -0.305 -0.258** -0.481 -0.576* 
Turkmenistan -0.406 -0.361 -0.269 -0.273 -0.325 -0.318 
Ukraine 1.475 0.929 1.132 0.954 0.963 0.284 
Serbia -1.412 -1.697 -1.282 -1.306 -1.655 -1.495 
Montenegro, Rep. of 1.301 0.661 0.313 0.228 1.079 3.032 
Hungary 5.887 -7.877 -7.936 -2.622 14.786 -2.971 
Croatia -0.505* -0.897*** -0.763*** -1.333*** -0.954*** -2.151*** 
Macedonia, FYR 0.114 -0.279 -0.250 -0.416* -0.347 -1.346*** 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.474 -0.925*** -0.949*** -0.924** -1.008*** -1.569*** 
Poland 42.013 -0.300 -7.001 -0.294 -10.919 -6.831 
Kosovo 0.901 1.034 0.919 0.598 1.621 3.115 
Romania 27.974** -2.517 52.033 -2.204 48.872 102.327 
# significant 22 21 40 40 40 45 
# significant and positive 20 16 16 19 17 8 
Share significant 24% 23% 44% 44% 44% 49% 
Share of significant and positive 22% 18% 18% 21% 19% 9% 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.b Error correction model: Long-Run Coefficient, Low-Income Countries 
 
Country  Total expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital  Non-interest  Interest payments 
Bolivia -19.900 -0.317 -2.953 0.207 -2.871 -3.367 
Haiti 8.413 2.893 24.743 3.108* 429.960 1.429 
Honduras 1.722** 0.116 0.728 0.408 0.372 -1.098 
Nicaragua 195.658 1.711*** 140.840 1.378*** 125.867 261.428 
Yemen -1.736 0.815 0.984 1.363 0.861 0.076 
Afghanistan 0.395** 0.219*** 0.232** 0.351*** 0.215** 0.054 
Bangladesh 0.138 0.635*** 0.397*** 0.490*** 0.546*** -0.077 
Bhutan 0.674*** 0.329** 0.447*** 0.301*** 0.446*** 0.036 
Myanmar 0.942*** 0.877** 0.960*** 0.898*** 0.853** 0.683** 
Cambodia 0.155 -0.122 0.212 0.019 0.068 -0.136 
Lao P.D.R. -6.144 2.541** 0.169 2.513** 0.030 -0.022 
Nepal 0.872 0.514** 0.612 0.367* 0.656 -0.165 
Vietnam -17.845 0.404*** -11.736 0.110 -13.157 -8.864 
Djibouti 0.219 0.078 0.292 0.326 0.187* 0.905 
Burundi 7.806 -8.578 21.966 -4.686 10.267 -1.045 
Cameroon 0.580 -0.460* -0.147 -0.636*** -0.370 -1.240** 
Central African Republic 1.156* -0.494 0.148 -0.622 0.023 -1.349 
Chad 0.194 -0.153 -0.001 -0.168 -0.011 -0.402** 
Comoros 0.397 -0.273 -0.435 -0.549 -0.509 -1.819*** 
Congo, Republic of 0.506** 0.236 0.070 0.090 0.057 -0.556* 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 117.542 -5.177 -104.100 -4.844 -113.914 -50.064 
Benin 0.637** -0.273 0.177 -0.351 0.272 -0.369 
Eritrea -1.738 -1.598 -1.121 -1.153 -1.018 0.149 
Ethiopia 1.080 0.510* 0.896* 0.458* 0.819 0.442 
Gambia, The 2.177*** 2.183*** 1.912*** 1.846*** 2.021*** 1.119*** 
Ghana 22.152 3.068*** 1.473 3.115*** 1.376 1.179 
Guinea-Bissau 0.514 0.447 0.192 0.234 0.301 -0.695 
Guinea 3.719*** 3.321*** 2.055* 3.007*** 2.474*** 1.446 
Côte d'Ivoire 1.090*** -0.058 0.370 -0.552 0.286 -1.276* 
Kenya 1.497*** 0.708 1.368*** 0.422 1.428*** 0.624 
Lesotho 1.573** 1.368*** 1.225*** 1.068*** 1.317*** 0.571* 
Liberia 0.189*** 0.102*** 0.082** 0.202*** 0.076 0.028 
Madagascar 8.473* 1.449 1.482 1.736** 0.772 0.546 
Malawi 8.136 2.729 6.591* 3.320* 6.709 4.201*** 
Mali 0.573 -0.155 0.082 -0.248 0.140 -0.481* 
Mauritania 0.521 0.022 0.624 0.481 0.274 -0.055 
Mozambique 13.472 0.213 -1.434 0.340 -1.457 -1.229 
Niger 0.710** -0.307 0.027 -0.354 0.070 -0.675** 
Nigeria 1.090 0.403 0.925 1.023 0.774 0.655 
Zimbabwe -0.346 0.047 0.053* 0.150 0.046 0.168 
Rwanda 2.841 0.113 5.130 0.259 7.344 -0.918 
São Tomé and Príncipe 19.434 0.452 -25.660 0.692 -33.005 -8.060 
Senegal 0.602 -0.151 0.085 -0.211 0.047 -0.663** 
Sierra Leone 6.102 0.581 0.540 0.733 0.506 1.122 
Sudan 6.637 -4.649 37.392 -4.766 26.155 111.000 
South Sudan -27.192 -0.186 -0.013 0.118 0.090 -0.305 
Tanzania 25.633 1.080** -2.401 1.262** -2.575 -1.131 
Togo 0.633 -0.738 -0.011 -0.748 -0.023 -1.126** 
Uganda 9.944** 0.642*** -4.320 0.457*** -4.718 -3.710 
Burkina Faso 0.286 -0.187 0.063 -0.212 0.054 -0.438** 
Zambia 11.193 0.725 -3.179 0.784 -6.197 -1.551 
Solomon Islands 5.568 -0.692 -4.100 0.162 -1.440 0.028 
Papua New Guinea 1.380*** 0.452 0.784 0.441 0.998* 0.208 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.395*** 1.162*** 1.242*** 1.044*** 1.132*** 0.430 
Moldova 1.088*** 0.731* 0.825* 0.670* 0.683* 0.067 
Tajikistan -0.003 -0.394 -0.028 -0.203 -0.134 -0.238 
Uzbekistan 2.991*** 4.394** 3.996** 3.839*** 3.884*** 4.068*** 
Mongolia 3.774 0.111 13.630 0.162 -2.464 0.791 
# significant 20 20 14 22 13 14 
# significant and positive 20 19 14 21 13 5 
Share significant 34% 34% 24% 38% 22% 24% 
Share of significant and positive 34% 33% 24% 36% 22% 9% 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.a Error correction model: Short-Run Coefficient, Emerging Market Economies 
 
Country  Total expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital  Non-interest  Interest payments 
Turkey -3.602*** -2.624*** -2.911*** -2.752*** -3.033*** -2.944*** 
South Africa -1.133 -0.360 -0.430 -1.140 -0.343 -0.657 
Argentina -8.535*** -2.777** -6.317*** -2.775** -6.369*** -6.407*** 
Brazil -9.682** 1.445 -4.841 1.260 -4.780 -4.580 
Chile -3.373*** -3.003*** -1.470*** -2.829*** -1.344*** -1.150* 
Colombia -2.016*** -2.974*** -1.745* -3.033*** -2.194*** -1.826* 
Costa Rica -3.329*** -2.029*** -1.102* -1.299* -1.503** -1.458** 
Dominican Republic -3.280*** -2.823*** -3.635*** -2.632*** -3.254*** -3.086** 
Ecuador -0.144 -0.305 -0.015 -0.204 -0.220 -0.904** 
El Salvador -0.492* -0.452 -0.205 0.034 -0.484** -0.228 
Guatemala -1.000 -1.997** 0.524 -1.799 0.664 -0.783 
Mexico -5.271 -3.854*** -4.258*** -4.123*** -4.961*** -5.052*** 
Panama 0.082 -0.435 -0.043 -0.231 -0.040 -0.347 
Paraguay -1.122* -1.482*** -0.735 -1.386** -0.628 -0.553 
Peru -10.558*** -0.925* -10.123*** -1.243** -9.929*** -9.931*** 
Uruguay -0.983 -1.654*** -0.890 -1.190** -0.909 -0.850 
Venezuela -2.981*** -1.622** -1.471** -1.288* -1.404** -1.969*** 
Antigua and Barbuda -0.230 -0.319** 0.076 -0.701*** -0.255** 0.069 
Bahamas, The -0.189 0.358 -0.328 -0.134 -0.082 0.031 
Barbados 0.063 0.018 -0.247 -1.089** -0.388** 0.236 
Dominica -0.076 -0.517 -0.517* -0.783 -0.378* -0.915* 
Grenada -0.065 0.039 -0.238 -0.442 -0.198 -0.154 
Guyana -0.289 -0.652* -0.440 0.565 -0.095 -0.012 
Belize -0.009 -0.956*** -0.011 -1.258*** -0.258*** -0.178 
Jamaica 0.069 0.725 -0.433 0.307 -0.554 -0.263 
St. Kitts and Nevis -0.396 -0.182 0.104 -0.299 -0.101 -0.501 
St. Lucia 0.306 -0.324 0.117 -0.388 -0.240 -0.115 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.170 -0.365 -0.377 -0.887 -0.522*** -0.827* 
Suriname -2.219** -2.324 -2.520* -1.595 -2.538* -2.505* 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.295 -0.735** -0.443 -0.837** -0.245 -0.438 
Bahrain -0.323* -1.510*** -0.224 -1.488** -0.242 -1.369** 
Iran 0.327 -0.743 1.068 -1.546 1.065 0.861 
Iraq -0.137 -0.145 -0.252** -0.282* -0.227** -0.155 
Jordan -0.077 -0.748** -1.021*** 0.153 -0.729** -1.528*** 
Kuwait -0.037 -0.075 -0.025 0.003 -0.027 -0.016 
Lebanon 0.013 -0.928*** 0.109 -0.649 0.183 0.115 
Oman 0.067 -0.320 0.130 0.341 -0.079 -0.127 
Qatar -0.054 -0.140 -0.099 -0.144 -0.069 -0.385** 
Saudi Arabia -0.009 -0.304 -0.131 -0.609* -0.215*** -0.540*** 
Syria 0.585 -0.594 0.657 -0.530 0.829 0.273 
United Arab Emirates -0.325*** -0.418* -0.077 -1.064*** -0.251*** -0.226 
Egypt -2.380*** -1.587 -3.957*** -3.157*** -4.204*** -3.696*** 
Brunei Darussalam -1.171*** -1.287* -1.259** -0.508 -0.984** -0.877 
Sri Lanka -0.349 -0.337 -0.422 -0.339 -0.401 0.024 
India -0.908* -2.066** -1.966*** -1.277 -2.017*** -1.799* 
Indonesia -4.499*** -5.138*** -4.571*** -5.148*** -4.674*** -4.550*** 
Timor-Leste 0.172** 0.043 0.144 0.442** 0.206*** -0.204 
Malaysia -1.539*** -2.075*** -1.463*** -2.204*** -1.486*** -1.340*** 
Maldives -0.433 -0.141 -0.189 -0.478* -0.091 0.129 
Pakistan -0.606 -2.413*** -1.831*** -2.535*** -1.524** -1.798* 
Philippines -1.891*** -2.481** -2.008*** -2.604*** -1.895*** -1.989*** 
Thailand -1.491*** -2.025*** -1.544*** -2.047*** -1.633*** -1.535*** 
Algeria -1.512** 1.247 -2.699*** 0.144 -2.957*** -1.795 
Angola -4.072** -0.085 -4.146* -0.171 -4.062* -4.087* 
Botswana -0.143 -0.093 -0.176 -0.184 -0.134 -0.453 
Cabo Verde 0.043 -0.325 0.209 -0.558 0.755 0.925 
Equatorial Guinea 0.071 0.085 0.256* 0.068 0.232* 0.220 
Gabon 0.074 0.059 0.451 -0.124 0.283 0.424 
Libya 0.047 -0.004 0.040 -0.001 0.039 0.001 
Mauritius -1.420*** -2.538** -0.941 -2.805** -1.833** -1.987** 
Morocco 0.041 0.037 0.214 -0.312 -0.130 -0.340 
Seychelles -0.404 -0.443 -0.028 -0.266 -0.346 -0.366 
Namibia -0.641 -1.592 -1.337 -1.399 -1.403 -2.284* 
Swaziland -0.113 -4.315* -0.958 -3.839 -1.260* -1.172 
Tunisia 0.012 -1.718** -0.520 -1.143 -0.503 -0.829 
Fiji -0.594* -0.280 -0.186 0.484 -0.305 -0.372 
Vanuatu -0.352 -0.999** -0.357 -1.353* -0.884** -0.846* 
Samoa -0.247 -0.441 0.007 -0.551 0.151 0.612 
Tonga 0.106 1.386** 0.147 1.249* 0.086 -0.106 
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Marshall Islands -0.115 0.067 0.418 0.458 0.205 0.288 
Micronesia 0.012 -0.341 0.007 -0.999 -0.355* -0.191 
Armenia 3.519* 3.548* 3.620* 3.174 3.378* 3.126 
Azerbaijan -1.691** -1.462* -1.205* -1.460* -1.363* -1.731** 
Belarus -2.900* -3.581** -2.884 -3.382** -3.240* -3.595** 
Albania -2.268*** 0.512 -1.940*** 0.749 -2.046*** -1.455** 
Georgia -1.621*** -1.487** -1.175 -1.478* -1.488** -1.595** 
Kazakhstan -2.096** -1.860** -1.090 -1.956** -1.512* -2.290*** 
Bulgaria -6.912*** 3.408 -6.806*** 2.907 -7.034*** -6.768*** 
Russia -4.364* -4.653* -4.379* -4.786* -4.386* -4.829** 
China 0.129 -0.325 0.351 0.203 0.506 0.573 
Turkmenistan -3.091* -3.334* -3.220* -3.375* -3.169* -3.319* 
Ukraine -2.153*** -2.062*** -1.833*** -2.149*** -1.909*** -2.223*** 
Serbia -1.018 -1.246 -0.865 -1.597 -1.264 -1.281 
Montenegro, Rep. of -1.006* -1.121* -0.904 -1.432* -0.965 -1.036* 
Hungary -1.418*** -0.812 -0.783 -0.688 -1.253** -0.532 
Croatia -1.340 -1.771** -1.153 -2.436*** -1.774** -1.875** 
Macedonia, FYR -1.583 -1.738* -1.423 -2.701** -1.638 -2.703** 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.412 -1.641 -1.979* -1.068 -1.639 -1.382 
Poland -3.456*** 0.900 -2.706* 1.048 -2.691* -2.194 
Kosovo -0.843 -0.787 -0.163 -0.569 -0.405 -0.738 
Romania -4.395*** -1.979*** -4.662*** -2.169*** -4.683*** -4.096*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.b Error correction model: Short-Run Coefficient, Low-Income Countries 
 
Country  Total expenditure Wages and salaries Goods and services Capital  Non-interest  Interest payments 
Bolivia -16.500*** -0.252 -11.022 -1.128 -10.717 -10.660 
Haiti -0.550 -0.364 -1.259** -0.332 -0.769 -0.819 
Honduras -0.832 -1.568*** -1.177 -1.803*** -1.182 -1.440* 
Nicaragua -6.888** 1.232 -23.430*** 1.244 -23.178*** -22.657*** 
Yemen -0.045 0.039 0.062 0.235 0.161 0.011 
Afghanistan 0.025 0.001 0.075 0.330 0.057 -0.193 
Bangladesh 0.530* -1.211 1.056 -3.229 0.228 0.957 
Bhutan -0.466 -1.271* -1.463*** -2.309*** -1.355*** -1.848*** 
Myanmar 3.347* 3.287 4.051* 3.629 3.424* 3.577* 
Cambodia -0.591 -2.199* -0.717 -2.066 -0.509 -1.156 
Lao P.D.R. -2.655* -14.819*** -2.881* -15.313*** -3.014* -2.375 
Nepal 0.231 -0.459 0.361 -0.159 0.124 -0.393 
Vietnam -0.986 -2.930** -14.426** -3.778** -14.158** -12.955** 
Djibouti -0.115 -0.211 -0.468 -1.103* -0.797*** -1.641*** 
Burundi -0.109 -0.358 -0.173 -0.012 -0.496 -0.456 
Cameroon 0.492 5.324** 0.816 5.813*** 1.109** 1.020* 
Central African Republic 0.405 0.366 0.335 0.307 0.318 0.248 
Chad -0.153 -0.318 -0.022 -0.330 -0.211 -0.339 
Comoros -1.078* -1.743** -1.128 -0.943 -1.023 -2.333*** 
Congo, Republic of -0.387 -1.833* -0.660 -1.704* -0.700 -0.678 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the -13.531*** -1.678 -14.814*** -1.747 -14.741*** -14.307*** 
Benin -0.872 -3.162 -1.318 -3.107 -1.478 -2.534* 
Eritrea -0.405 -0.212 -0.530 -0.362 -0.411 0.013 
Ethiopia 0.574* 1.534*** 0.723* 1.532*** 0.782* 0.832* 
Gambia, The -0.146 0.166 -0.013 0.233 0.080 -0.076 
Ghana 0.960 -3.114** 3.883** -3.138** 3.557** 3.830** 
Guinea-Bissau -0.177 0.090 -0.085 0.180 -0.035 -0.323 
Guinea 0.435 0.880 -0.636 0.481 -0.005 -0.445 
Côte d'Ivoire -0.278 0.535 -0.080 0.902 0.384 0.716 
Kenya -1.802*** -1.196 -2.675*** -0.445 -2.844*** -3.023*** 
Lesotho 0.277 -5.490*** -0.869 -5.281*** -2.204 -2.228 
Liberia 0.052 -0.009 0.121* 0.242** 0.051 -0.289*** 
Madagascar -0.885* -0.407 -0.151 0.083 -0.494 -0.315 
Malawi -1.257** -1.225 -1.506** -1.306 -1.107* -0.965 
Mali -0.613 0.658 -0.238 0.798 -0.662 -0.455 
Mauritania -0.419 -0.067 -0.181 0.384 0.111 0.234 
Mozambique 1.268 -0.157 2.401** -0.093 2.554*** 2.434** 
Niger 0.163 0.647 0.077 0.481 0.020 -0.154 
Nigeria -1.390 -1.735 -0.879 -0.606 -1.067 -1.178 
Zimbabwe 0.010 0.209 0.275*** 0.623*** 0.130 0.005 
Rwanda 0.185 0.532** 0.162 0.620*** 0.272 0.225 
São Tomé and Príncipe -0.047 -0.429 1.486 -0.252 1.574 1.788 
Senegal -0.170 -1.884 -0.374 -1.430 0.064 -0.351 
Sierra Leone -0.578 -0.151 -0.405 -0.119 -0.499 -0.532 
Sudan -4.301** -1.815 -2.575 -2.325* -2.447 -2.753 
South Sudan -7.278 -1.292 -0.125 0.766 1.122 5.573 
Tanzania 1.247 -1.495 2.390 -2.146 1.600 0.628 
Togo 0.304 1.031** 0.389 0.897* 0.227 0.309 
Uganda -2.683 -1.330 -2.699 -1.698 -2.279 -2.633 
Burkina Faso 0.396 -1.142 -0.348 -1.092 -0.133 -0.047 
Zambia -2.326** -0.672 -2.632** -0.364 -2.383** -2.872*** 
Solomon Islands -0.253 -0.134 -0.483** 0.102 -0.166 0.011 
Papua New Guinea -0.470 -1.149** -0.537 -0.914 -0.387 -0.453 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.845 0.981 0.831 0.891 1.045 0.570 
Moldova 0.036 0.072 0.088 0.051 0.199 -0.300 
Tajikistan -0.474 -0.589 0.192 -0.488 0.136 -0.343 
Uzbekistan -9.400*** -11.637*** -10.259*** -10.126*** -10.437*** -11.437*** 
Mongolia -5.257*** -0.803 -5.451*** -0.879 -5.578*** -5.013*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.a Determinants of Short-Run Expenditure Cyclicality, cross-country WLS 
regressions 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Exp_lr Exp_lr Exp_lr Wage_lr GS_lr Capital_lr Nonint_lr Intpay_lr  
Real GDP per capita -0.544** 0.077 -0.288 -0.090 -0.066 -0.073 -0.074 -0.053 
 (0.245) (0.315) (0.311) (0.323) (0.452) (0.321) (0.446) (0.435) 
Government size -0.399*** -0.657*** -0.452*** -0.071 -0.327** -0.112 -0.328** -0.303** 
 (0.076) (0.095) (0.103) (0.106) (0.149) (0.106) (0.147) (0.143) 
Trade openness -0.009 -0.074 -0.714 -0.215 -0.371 -0.273 -0.277 -0.050 
 (0.007) (0.904) (0.850) (0.882) (1.235) (0.877) (1.217) (1.187) 
Polity2     -0.018 0.002 0.036 -0.014 0.020 0.024 
   (0.084) (0.087) (0.122) (0.087) (0.121) (0.118) 
Constraints on the executive   -0.027 -0.016 -0.031 -0.023 -0.034 -0.034 
   (0.032) (0.034) (0.047) (0.034) (0.047) (0.045) 
Margin of majority   -1.199 0.712 -0.941 0.093 -0.962 -0.229 
   (2.049) (2.126) (2.976) (2.115) (2.934) (2.861) 
Executive elections   -3.541 2.045 -1.122 1.353 -1.282 -2.056 
   (3.450) (3.580) (5.010) (3.561) (4.940) (4.817) 
Proportional representation    0.243 0.774 0.620 0.980 0.561 0.529 
   (0.600) (0.623) (0.871) (0.619) (0.859) (0.838) 
Checks and balances   0.033 0.179 0.050 0.261 0.086 0.173 
   (0.421) (0.437) (0.612) (0.435) (0.603) (0.588) 
Durability of regime (in years)   0.004 0.005 -0.021 0.002 -0.022 -0.015 
   (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) 
Private credit (% GDP)  0.019       
  (0.117)       
Observations 140 82 103 103 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.344 0.468 0.343 0.036 0.108 0.051 0.111 0.101 
Note: dependent variable denotes the coefficient estimates for the long-run cyclicality. Suffix “_lr” denotes long-run. 
Cross sectional regression estimated with weighted least squares (WLS) with weights given by the inverse of the 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis. Constant term omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7.b Determinants of Long-Run Expenditure Cyclicality, cross-country WLS 
regressions 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Exp_lr Exp_lr Exp_lr Wage_lr GS_lr Capital_lr Nonint_lr Intpay_lr  
Real GDP per capita 0.222 -4.197 0.956 -0.099 -2.679 0.112 8.622 2.791 
 (4.045) (6.081) (5.217) (0.710) (17.413) (0.323) (7.234) (4.529) 
Government size -0.061 1.819 -0.903 -0.400* -5.953 -0.336*** -9.430*** -3.100** 
 (1.248) (1.829) (1.719) (0.234) (5.737) (0.106) (2.383) (1.492) 
Trade openness -0.029 -0.422 -6.456 -1.439 -3.783 -1.090 -22.344 -6.865 
 (0.110) (17.445) (14.248) (1.939) (47.555) (0.881) (19.757) (12.368) 
Polity2     -0.584* -0.057 0.915 0.035 -1.616 -0.600 
   (0.333) (0.192) (4.716) (0.087) (1.959) (1.226) 
Constraints on the executive   0.028 -0.018 1.648 0.014 -0.787 -0.146 
   (0.545) (0.074) (1.818) (0.034) (0.755) (0.473) 
Margin of majority   -23.472 -1.600 -89.413 -1.190 -39.908 3.002 
   (34.342) (4.674) (114.625) (2.124) (47.621) (29.812) 
Executive elections   6.047 5.618* 4.548** 6.633* 33.844 17.276 
   (57.822) (7.870) (192.996) (3.576) (80.180) (50.195) 
Proportional representation    6.119 -2.934** 49.392 -1.739*** 7.135 3.786 
   (10.056) (1.369) (33.566) (0.622) (13.945) (8.730) 
Checks and balances   0.721 0.731 -16.324 0.221 6.643 3.312 
   (7.059) (0.961) (23.560) (0.437) (9.788) (6.128) 
Durability of regime (in years)   -0.099 0.055 -0.986 0.025 -0.306 -0.064 
   (0.340) (0.046) (1.135) (0.021) (0.471) (0.295) 
Private credit (% GDP)  -0.124       
  (0.278)       
Observations 140 82 103 103 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.001 0.020 0.018 0.131 0.087 0.217 0.168 0.050 
Note: dependent variable denotes the coefficient estimates for the long-run cyclicality. Suffix “_lr” denotes long-run. 
Cross sectional regression estimated with weighted least squares (WLS) with weights given by the inverse of the 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis. Constant term omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
 
List of countries 
Emerging Market Economies:  
Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Belize, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Brunei Darussalam, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Seychelles, Namibia, Swaziland, Tunisia, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Russia, China, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland, Kosovo, Romania 
 
Low-Income Countries: 
Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Cambodia, Lao P.D.R., 
Nepal, Vietnam, Djibouti, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Burkina 
Faso, Zambia, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Mongolia 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard deviation Minimum  Maximum  
RGDP growth 6227 0.035 0.066 -1.02 0.906 
Total government expenditure (% GDP) 8580 31.64 4.82 18.96 40.76 
Expenditure on wages and salaries (% GDP) 4797 7.73 0.44 6.89 8.46 
Expenditure on goods and services (% GDP) 6657 6.88 0.89 5.73 8.39 
Capital expenditure (% GDP) 4797 2.33 0.34 1.86 2.94 
Non-interest expenditure (% GDP) 6657 37.51 3.71 32.70 44.32 
Interest payments (% GDP) 6657 3.22 0.98 2.01 5.04 
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Table A2. Endogeneity Test: Durbin-Wu-Hausman P-values 
 
Country  
Total 
expenditure 
Turkey 0.84 
South Africa 0.35 
Argentina 0.02 
Brazil 0.73 
Chile 0.09 
Colombia 0.47 
Costa Rica 0.53 
Dominican Republic 0.57 
Ecuador 0.44 
El Salvador 0.42 
Guatemala 0.54 
Mexico 0.08 
Panama 0.05 
Paraguay 0.00 
Peru 0.60 
Uruguay 0.83 
Venezuela 0.65 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.81 
Bahamas, The 0.88 
Barbados 0.16 
Dominica 0.03 
Grenada 0.65 
Guyana 0.60 
Belize 0.24 
Jamaica 0.25 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.13 
St. Lucia 0.81 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 0.51 
Suriname 0.89 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.39 
Bahrain 0.16 
Iran 0.06 
Iraq 0.97 
Jordan 0.03 
Kuwait 0.77 
Lebanon 0.66 
Oman 0.54 
Qatar 0.64 
Saudi Arabia 0.78 
Syria 0.85 
United Arab Emirates 0.95 
Egypt 0.24 
Brunei Darussalam 0.56 
Sri Lanka 0.48 
India 0.00 
Indonesia  
Timor-Leste 0.07 
Malaysia 0.47 
Maldives 0.59 
Pakistan 0.04 
Philippines 0.55 
Thailand 0.02 
Algeria 0.03 
Angola  
Botswana 0.40 
Cabo Verde 0.47 
Equatorial Guinea 0.21 
Gabon 0.74 
Libya 0.89 
Mauritius 0.23 
Morocco 0.19 
Seychelles  
Namibia  
Swaziland 0.13 
Tunisia 0.01 
Fiji 0.16 
Vanuatu 0.30 
Samoa 0.01 
Tonga  
Marshall Islands  
Micronesia 0.01 
Armenia 0.47 
Azerbaijan 0.60 
Belarus 0.00 
Albania 0.33 
Georgia 0.50 
Kazakhstan 0.35 
Bulgaria 0.92 
Russia 0.50 
China 0.85 
Turkmenistan 0.67 
Ukraine  
Serbia  
Montenegro, Rep. of 0.81 
Hungary 0.17 
Croatia 0.25 
Macedonia, FYR 0.01 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.19 
Poland  
Kosovo 0.02 
Romania  
Bolivia 0.29 
Haiti 0.30 
Honduras 0.39 
Nicaragua 0.00 
Yemen 0.15 
Afghanistan 0.92 
Bangladesh 0.32 
Bhutan  
Myanmar 0.88 
Cambodia 0.90 
Lao P.D.R. 0.53 
Nepal 0.21 
Vietnam 0.01 
Djibouti 0.23 
Burundi 0.62 
Cameroon 0.66 
Central African Republic  
Chad 0.18 
Comoros 0.38 
Congo, Republic of 0.09 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the 0.48 
Benin 0.00 
Eritrea 0.12 
Ethiopia  
Gambia, The 0.71 
Ghana 0.84 
Guinea-Bissau 0.00 
Guinea 0.65 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.81 
Kenya 0.74 
Lesotho 0.65 
Liberia  
Madagascar 0.49 
Malawi 0.34 
Mali 0.23 
Mauritania 0.05 
Mozambique 0.35 
Niger 0.14 
Nigeria 0.91 
Zimbabwe 0.26 
Rwanda 0.01 
São Tomé and Príncipe  
Senegal 0.39 
Sierra Leone 0.60 
Sudan 0.61 
South Sudan 0.06 
Tanzania  
Togo 0.86 
Uganda 0.01 
Burkina Faso 0.33 
Zambia 0.53 
Solomon Islands 0.11 
Papua New Guinea 0.01 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.61 
Moldova 0.44 
Tajikistan 0.01 
Uzbekistan 0.00 
Mongolia 0.87 
 Table A3. Mean Group Regressions of total government expenditure - Before and after GFC 
Dependent variable Government Expenditure 
Time period Before GFC After GFC 
Country Group EME LIC EME LIC 
     
Speed of adjustment -0.161*** -0.132*** -0.541*** -0.638*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.042) (0.054) 
Short run coefficient -1.241*** -1.554*** -1.173*** -1.133*** 
 (0.289) (0.506) (0.206) (0.366) 
Long run coefficient 4.356** 14.781 1.572 0.579 
 (1.780) (17.561) (1.621) (0.537) 
     
Observations 2,880 1,774 901 576 
Note: Estimation of Equation (5). Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table A4. Mean Group Regressions of expenditure components - Before and after GFC 
Dependent variable Wages and Salaries Goods and Services  Capital expenditure Non-interest expenditure Interest payments 
Time period before after before after before after before after before after 
Country Group EME LIC EME LIC EME LIC EME LIC EME LIC 
           
Speed of adjustment -0.265*** -0.919*** -0.232*** -1.103*** -0.337*** -0.800*** -0.234*** -0.878*** -0.202*** -0.736*** 
 (0.021) (0.080) (0.021) (0.072) (0.054) (0.086) (0.020) (0.128) (0.017) (0.190) 
Short run coefficient -0.988*** -1.302*** -1.361*** -0.857*** -0.845*** -1.440*** -1.468*** -1.215*** -1.468*** -1.282*** 
 (0.281) (0.308) (0.310) (0.321) (0.278) (0.342) (0.308) (0.277) (0.302) (0.278) 
Long run coefficient -1.385 0.005 2.780 -1.305 -7.086 1.151 -0.033 -5.528 7.836 -0.468 
 (1.144) (1.009) (3.265) (1.469) (5.964) (0.912) (3.941) (5.666) (10.033) (0.854) 
           
Observations 2,419 1,199 3,577 1,199 2,419 1,199 3,577 1,199 3,577 1,199 
Note: Estimation of Equation (5). Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A5. Pedroni (2004) Panel Cointegration Tests of real GDP with Government 
Expenditures 
EME Statistic Government 
Expenditures 
Wages and 
Salaries 
Goods and 
services 
Capital 
expenditure 
Non-interest 
expenditure 
Interest 
Payments 
 (no 
trend) 
      
Within 
dimension 
Panel v 0.215 -0.415 0.098 -0.415 0.098 0.098 
 Panel  0.109 0.564 1.031 0.5647 1.031 1.031 
 Panel PP 0.571 -0.507 0.995 -0.507 0.995 0.995 
 Panel 
ADF 
0.068 1.291 1.575 1.291 1.575 1.575 
Between 
dimension 
Panel  1.361 1.226 1.989 1.226 1.989 1.989 
 Panel PP 0.322 -1.251 0.683 -1.251 0.683 0.683 
 Panel 
ADF 
-1.466 -1.888* -0.403 -1.888* -0.403 -0.403 
LIC Statistic Government 
Expenditures 
Wages and 
Salaries 
Goods and 
services 
Capital 
expenditure 
Non-interest 
expenditure 
Interest 
Payments 
 (no 
trend) 
      
Within 
dimension 
Panel v 1.052 1.929 1.249 1.929 1.249 1.249 
 Panel  -0.690 -2.313* -0.750 -2.313* -0.750 -0.750 
 Panel PP -0.901 -4.918* -0.923 -4.918* -0.923 -0.923 
 Panel 
ADF 
-0.211 1.039 0.084 1.039 0.084 0.084 
Between 
dimension 
Panel  -0.079 -1.559 0.185 -1.559 0.185 0.185 
 Panel PP -1.717 -7.368* -1.384 -7.368* -1.384 -1.384 
 Panel 
ADF 
-0.611 0.480 0.519 0.480 0.519 0.519 
Notes: Cointegration tests between real GDP and different government expenditure variables. The null is that there is 
no cointegration. Under the null all the statistics are distributed as standard Normal distributions. An asterisk (*) 
indicates rejection at the 10 percent level or better. The columns labelled within-dimension contain the computed 
value of the statistics based on estimators that pool the autoregressive coefficient across different countries for the unit 
root tests on the estimated residuals. The columns labelled between-dimension report the computed value of the 
statistics based on estimators that average individually calculated coefficients for each country. 
 
 
 
 
